Current Table of Contents

• Do auctions select efficient firms?*
  We consider a government auctioning off multiple licences to firms that compete in an aftermarket. Firms have different costs, and cost-efficiency is private information in the auction and in the aftermarket. If only one licence is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction as it has the highest valuation for the licence. We analyse conditions under which this result does and does not generalise to the case of auctioning multiple licences and aftermarket competition. Strategic interaction in the aftermarket is responsible for the fact that auctions may select inefficient firms.
• Supply Side Interventions and Redistribution*
  We evaluate the effect on welfare of shifting the burden of capital income taxes to labour taxes in a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and constant tax rates. We calibrate and simulate the economy; we find that lowering capital taxes has two effects: it increases efficiency in terms of aggregate production and it redistributes wealth in favour of those agents with a low wage/wealth ratio. When the parameters of the model are calibrated to match the distribution of income in terms of the wage/wealth ratio, the redistributive effect dominates, and agents with a high wage/wealth ratio would experience a large loss in utility if capital income taxes were eliminated.
• Inflation Target Shocks and Monetary Policy Inertia in the Euro Area*
  The euro area as a whole has experienced a marked downward trend in inflation over the past decades and, concomitantly, a protracted period of depressed activity. Can permanent and gradual shifts in monetary policy be held responsible for these dynamics? To answer this question, we embed serially correlated changes in the inflation target into a DSGE model with real and nominal frictions. The formal Bayesian estimation of the model suggests that gradual changes in the inflation target have played a major role in the euro area business cycle. Counter-factual exercises show that, had monetary policy implemented its new inflation objective at a faster rate, the euro zone would have experienced more sustained growth than it actually did.
• Smarter task assignment or greater effort: the impact of incentives on team performance*
  We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise individual performance but that managers also disproportionately reallocated efficient workers to the incentivised tasks. We show that this reallocation was the more important contributor to the overall outcome.
• Identification of Technology Shocks in Structural Vars*
  The usefulness of SVARs for developing empirically plausible models is actually subject to controversies in macroeconomics. We propose a two-step SVARs-based procedure which consistently estimates the effect of permanent technology shocks on aggregate variables. Simulation experiments from a standard business cycle model and a sticky prices model show that our approach outperforms standard SVARs. The two-step procedure, when applied to actual data, predicts a significant short-run decrease of hours after a technology improvement followed by a hump-shaped positive response. Additionally, the rate of inflation and the nominal interest rate displays a significant decrease after this shock.
• Protestants and catholics: similar work ethic, different social ethic*
  This article develops two hypotheses about economically-relevant values of Christian believers, according to which Protestants should work more and more effectively, as in the 'work ethic' argument of Max Weber, or display a stronger 'social ethic' that would lead them to monitor each other's conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold more homogeneous values. Tests using current survey data confirm substantial partial correlations and possible different 'effects' in mutual social control, institutional performance and homogeneity of values but no difference in work ethics. Protestantism therefore seems conducive to capitalist economic development, not by the direct psychological route of the Weberian work ethic but rather by promoting an alternative social ethic that facilitates impersonal trade.
• Advance Purchase Discounts versus Clearance Sales*
  This article considers advance selling problems. It explains why some goods (e.g. airline tickets) are sold cheap to early buyers, while others (e.g. theatre tickets) offer discounts to those who buy late. We derive the profit maximising selling strategy for a monopolist when aggregate demand is certain but buyers face uncertainty about their individual demands. When aggregate demand exceeds capacity, both Advance Purchase Discounts as well as Clearance Sales might be optimal. We determine how the comparison of these price discrimination strategies depends on the rationing rule, capacity costs and the availability of temporal capacity limits, price commitment and resale.
• A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms*
  This article investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods. We focus on an environment characterised by income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. Our analysis compares experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary contribution mechanism. We find that prize-based mechanisms perform better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, contributions are significantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction, both overall and by individual income types.
• Competition, Market Selection and Growth*
  We study the effect of the competitive selection process on the economy's rate of growth. In an extension of standard quality-ladder models of endogenous growth, we allow for the possibility that in each period several asymmetric firms (representing an endogenously determined number of past innovators) may be simultaneously active in an industry. Stronger competitive pressure then has conflicting effects on the incentive to innovate, lowering prices but also selecting the more efficient firms. We show that the market selection effect of competition always increases the incentive to innovate and find circumstances in which it can outweigh the traditional negative effect of lower prices.
• The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes in Choice and Pricing Tasks*
  We examine the robustness of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under two elicitation procedures. We find that individuals are, on average, risk-seeking over low-probability gains and high-probability losses and risk-averse over high-probability gains and low-probability losses when we elicit prices for the gambles. However, a choice-based elicitation procedure, where participants choose between a gamble and its expected value, yields individual decisions that are indistinguishable from random choice. Sensitivity to elicitation procedure holds between and within participants, and remains when participants are allowed to review and change decisions. The price elicitation procedure is more complex; this finding may be further evidence that an increase in cognitive load exacerbates behavioural anomalies.
• Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling*
  We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in different regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting benefits such as child benefits to one household member may not always have an effect on outcomes.
• E-Commerce and the Market Structure of Retail Industries*
  This article examines the effect of the advent and diffusion of e-commerce on supply-side industry structure. We specify a general industry model involving consumers with differing search costs buying products from heterogeneous producers. We interpret e-commerce as a reduction in consumers' search costs. We show how it reallocates market shares from high-cost to low-cost producers. We test the model using US data for three industries: travel agencies, bookstores and new car dealers. Each industry exhibits the market share shifts predicted by the model but the mechanisms vary, ranging from aggregate factors in the travel industry to local-market factors in the other two industries.
• Endogenous Constitutions*
  We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also find that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by centre-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.
• Choice Under Uncertainty: Evidence from Ethiopia, India and Uganda*
  We review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Using these data we estimate that just over 50% of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory. Our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately. However, when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously, we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk-seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory.
• Intertemporal Tradeoffs for Gains and Losses: An Experimental Measurement of Discounted Utility*
  This article provides a parameter-free measurement of utility in intertemporal choice and presents new and more robust evidence on the discounting of money outcomes. Intertemporal utility was concave for gains and convex for losses, consistent with a hypothesis put forward by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Discount rates declined over time but less so than previously observed under the assumption of linear utility. For approximately 40% of our subjects constant discounting provided the best fit. The remaining 60% were most consistent with Harvey's (1986) power discounting. Our data provide little support for the popular quasi-hyperbolic model, which is widely used in economics today. We observed an asymmetry in the discounting of gains and losses that, unlike earlier findings, cannot be explained by a framing effect.
• The Welfare Economics of Optional Water Metering*
  A model of decentralised metering decisions that applies to the water industry is developed. The social benefit of metering is higher the more sensitive demand is to the price. Allowing households to choose whether or not to have meters is efficient when only small households should have meters but does not work when the regulator does not know household characteristics and only larger households should have meters. The policy of requiring meters to be provided free, which has been adopted in England and Wales, is analysed.
• Contraception as Development? New Evidence from Family Planning in Colombia*
  There has been considerable debate in the last decade about whether or not family planning programmes in developing countries reduce fertility or improve socio-economic outcomes. This article provides new evidence by studying the expansion of one of the world's oldest and largest family planning organisations [ndash] Profamilia of Colombia. It finds that family planning explains less than 10% of Colombia's fertility decline during its demographic transition. As in wealthy countries, however, lowering the costs of first birth postponement produced important socio-economic gains, enabling young women to obtain more education and to work more and live independently later in life.
• Is Hanukkah Responsive to Christmas?*
  We use individual-level survey and county-level expenditure data to examine the extent to which Hanukkah celebrations among US Jews are driven by the presence of Christmas. We document that Jews with young children are more likely to celebrate Hanukkah, that this effect is greater for reform Jews and for strongly-identified Jews, and that Jewish-related expenditure on Hanukkah is higher in counties with lower shares of Jews. All these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that celebration of religious holidays is designed not only for worship and enjoyment but also to provide a counterbalance for children against competing cultural influences.
• Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning*
  This article reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context.
• Oil and the Great Moderation*
  We assess the extent to which the greater US macroeconomic stability since the mid-1980s can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil elasticity of gross output. We estimate a DSGE model and perform counterfactual simulations. We nest two popular explanations for the Great Moderation: smaller (non-oil\link real shocks and better monetary policy. We find that oil played an important role in the stabilisation. Around half of the reduced volatility of inflation is explained by better monetary policy alone, and 57% of the reduced volatility of GDP growth is attributed to smaller TFP shocks. Oil related effects explain around a third.
• Estimating Class-Size Effects using Within-School Variation in Subject-Specific Classes*
  Selection response of parents to low school quality, for instance large class sizes, is a major problem when estimating causal class-size effects, also in experimental and quasi-experimental studies. To address this problem a new identification strategy using within-school variation over time in the size of subject-specific classes is proposed. It provides random class-size variation and enables tests for possible selection using test scores in other subjects. Applying this approach to Danish administrative data, highly significant and substantial positive effects of reducing class size are found on examination marks in French. Effects are larger for academically weak students and for boys.
• Employment and wage effects of privatisation: evidence from Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine*
  We use longitudinal methods and universal panel data on 30,000 initially state-owned manufacturing firms in four transition economies to estimate the impact of privatisation on employment and wages. The results consistently reject job losses and never imply large wage cuts from either domestic or foreign privatisation. The domestic privatisation estimates are close to zero for employment; for wages, they are negative but small in magnitude. Estimated foreign privatisation effects are nearly always positive and sometimes large for both outcome variables. We interpret the employment and wage results in terms of underlying scale, productivity and cost effects of privatisation.
• Dry Laws and Homicides: Evidence from the São Paulo Metropolitan Area*
  We use a difference-in-differences design to estimate the causal impact of the adoption of dry laws in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) on violent behaviour. Dry laws cause a 10% reduction in homicides. Similar impacts were found on battery and deaths by car accidents.
• Turning a Blind Eye: Costly Enforcement, Credible Commitment and Minimum Wage Laws*
  In many countries, non-compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to legislation they have themselves passed. We show that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with ex post credibility, in a model of minimum wage policy with imperfect competition, imperfect enforcement and imperfect commitment. Since credible enforcement requires costly ex post transfer of income from employers to workers, a government concerned only with efficiency but not with distribution is shown, paradoxically, to be unable to credibly elicit efficiency improvements via a minimum wage reform.
• On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox*
  We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes.
• Weather to go to college
  Does current utility bias predictions of future utility for high stakes decisions? Here I provide field evidence consistent with such Projection Bias in one of life's most thought-about decisions: college enrolment. After arguing and documenting with survey evidence that cloudiness increases the appeal of academic activities, I analyse the enrolment decisions of 1,284 prospective students who visited a university known for its academic strengths and recreational weaknesses. Consistent with the notion that current weather conditions influence decisions about future academic activities, I find that an increase in cloudcover of one standard deviation on the day of the visit is associated with an increase in the probability of enrolment of 9 percentage points.
• Sequential legislative lobbying under political certainty*
  In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e. if he anticipates winning the battle. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of game's key parameters on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory.
• R&D Portfolio and Market Structure*
  This article analyses how firms allocate their resources when they compete for multiple patents in heterogeneous research projects simultaneously. A simple model shows that firms' resource allocation is biased away from risky and basic research, even when imitation is not possible and firms are fully rational. Therefore a market may lack major innovations despite large aggregate research expenditure and strong patent protection. This article also shows that as a market becomes more competitive, firms invest relatively less in basic research but more in risky research. These results provide a novel explanation for an ambiguous empirical relationship between innovation and market concentration.
• An empirical model of collective household labour supply with non-participation*
  I present a structural empirical model of collective household labour supply that includes the non-participation decision. I specify a simultaneous model for hours, participation and wages of husband and wife. I discuss the problems of identification and statistical coherency that arise in the application of the collective household labour supply model. The model includes random effects and it is estimated using a panel data set of Dutch couples. The estimates allow me to check the underlying regularity conditions on individual preferences and to obtain estimates of the sharing rule that governs the division of household income between husband and wife.